combat, such as strikes, raids or peace enforcement, they may look very similar to war. Non-combat operations include disaster relief, nation assistance, and support to federal, state and local governments. Both combat and non-combat forms of MOOTW can occur before, after or during a war, or they can be entirely unrelated to war.
MOOTW can be short-lived, as is often the case in disaster relief operations, or protracted operations that may continue for many years. Long-term operations in particular tend to change focus as objectives, participants and conditions change over time.
There are principles of MOOTW, just as there are principles of war, intended to guide the conduct of operations in order to ensure success. Unity of effort, a principle of MOOTW, is a variation of unity of command, which is one of the principles of war. Unity of command "ensure[s] unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.
[It] means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose." Examples in this paper will be drawn from the latter two phases.
Achieving Unity of Effort
In war, unity of command is relatively easy to achieve due to the command and control (C2) structure of the military.
Typically, the military uses a hierarchical structure in which all participants are part of a chain of command headed by a single commander. In MOOTW, command and control is much more complicated; thus, unity of effort is more difficult to grasp.
The internal command and control structure of military forces is likely to be clear cut and unambiguous; however, nonmilitary participants in the operation are not normally an integral part of that structure. They likely report to their own headquarters organizations, and have no obligation or inclination to report to a military commander, or even a civilian from another agency designated to be in charge of an operation. In the case of NGOs and PVOs, the structure is often horizontal; that is, all members are essentially equals and do not report to one another. ...the major challenge for a United Nations force commander is that very often, contingent commanders either have access to or are under orders to call back to their national capitals before they either say 'Yes, sir,' or 'No, sir' to the force commander. You cannot have a strong command or chain of command given that kind of circumstance. 9 During UNOSOM II, many nations who had agreed to provide troops for humanitarian assistance began to question why their troops were now involved in combat. The following describes the problems that resulted:
This concern manifested itself in a pronounced tendency for some of these national contingents to seek guidance from their respective capitals before carrying out even routine tactical orders. According to published reports, the commander of the Italian contingent went so far as to open separate negotiations with the fugitive warlord Mohammed Aideed--apparently with the full approval of his home government. As an operation moves through various phases, the C2 structure may change. A well-functioning team in one phase may be replaced entirely by a new team in the next phase.
Although some turnover may occur, continuity will be severely reduced, and the new team will inevitably go through a period of djustment.
In Somalia, the lead nation option was used during UNITAF, and the parallel option was employed during UNOSOM II.
The former proved to be much more effective, due in large part to its relative simplicity. The transition was less than ideal for a number of reasons. General Montgomery met his staff for the first time when he arrived in Somalia. The staff was not a group that had been working together for some As indicated previously, unity of effort is inextricably linked to objectives and desired end state. Unless objectives and the desired end state are explicitly stated and, perhaps more importantly, clearly understood at all levels, unity of effort will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Further, participants in a MOOTW must be working toward the same objectives and end state.
Each nation that enters into a coalition has its own motives for doing so--some to provide real military capabilities, others for the sake of appearances. Whatever, the motive for participating, it undoubtedly has some effect on the degree to which a nation supports the objectives of the operation. Although the U.S. mission supported that of the U.N., the U.S. mission was much less ambitious and much more limited in scope. There was apparently some disagreement between these two key players as to the mission.
Leaders at the strategic level must address unity of effort when they are determining objectives and desired end states. It is imperative that civilian leaders at this level consult with military leaders to ensure that the objectives they are setting can be supported militarily. If other nations are to take part in an operation, our leaders must ensure that our national strategic objectives are in concert with those of the other nations involved and that those nations can and will support the objectives and desired end state.
Another example is the difference in, or rather, the lack of coordination between, objectives of the military and HROs.
The military mission in Somalia was to provide security for delivery of humanitarian assistance. Yet decisions regarding how this was to be done were often made without the input of those actually delivering food and supplies to the Somalis, which hampered the efforts of the HROs.
UNITAF concentration on protecting a few major food transport corridors while simultaneously disarming NGOs served to limit NGO activities and concentrate food aid in a few major centers (which had become food distribution centers or havens for Somalis displaced by the fighting). This both attracted looters and added to health and water problems associated with large population concentrations. It also impeded NGO outreach to more distant rural areas not secured by UNITAF. . . , 17 Although military forces likely believed they were successfully achieving their mission, thus allowing the NGOs and PVOs to accomplish theirs, they were, in reality, preventing that from happening to some extent. Coordination from the outset would aid in tying military objectives to those of HROs.
The problem described above may also be the result to some degree of cultural differences between various participants in MOOTW. These differences impact their abilities to work as a cohesive, effective team. The military and HRO cultures are at opposite ends of the spectrum, as became apparent in Somalia:
The military was frustrated by what they viewed as disorganization and waste growing out of a tendency not to conduct detailed planning. Individually, they saw relief workers as young, liberal, anti-military, academic, self-righteous, incompetent, expatriate cowboys who came to an area for a short time to 'do good 1 without fully considering the consequences....At the same time, many relief workers saw military officers as inflexible, conservative, and bureaucratic. They found them insensitive to Somali suffering.... Attitudes and perceptions of this nature often make it difficult for such diverse groups to break down barriers between them enough to accomplish the tasks at hand. Such differences are not easy to resolve. To address the cultural differences, exchanges need to occur on a regular basis prior to the start of a crisis, whenever possible. Stereotypes and misunderstandings are often easier to overcome when the parties involved have ample opportunity to interact on a regular basis without the added pressures of a crisis.
Forces from different nations also have to deal with cultural differences. There are language barriers, religious differences, varying work ethics, and longstanding feuds between nations that must be considered by a commander attempting to establish an effective coalition.
All of these differences among participants in MOOTW contribute to the difficulties of managing such an operation, and thus achieving unity of effort.
ConeX-ms ions
Unity of effort in military operations other than war is very difficult to attain. Without it, the probability of success of an operation is greatly reduced.
As seen in the case of Somalia, the wide variety of participants in MOOTW brings unique problems. These problems include command and control, lack of clearly defined objectives and desired end state, different objectives among the participants, and cultural differences. Each of these issues must be considered and addressed from the outset of an operation if the impact is to be minimized. Because of the constantly changing circumstances of MOOTW, they must be addressed throughout the operation as well. Continual reassessment by political and military leaders working in concert with each other is required. Coordination among agencies even before a crisis occurs would aid even further in achieving unity of effort.
As MOOTW become more commonplace for U.S. military forces, cooperation, coordination and consensus-building among a wide variety of participants is essential if unity of effort is to be achieved.
